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CYBERTHREATS AND THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT:
SPECULATIONS
Susan W. Brenner*
INTRODUCTION
As I have explained elsewhere, cyberthreats – cybercrime,
cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare – create new challenges for
nation-states because they do not conform to the essentially
dichotomous threat model that has evolved over the last few
centuries.1 Every human social system must maintain a baseline of
order if it is to survive and prosper.2 Order is essential if the
individuals who comprise such a system are to carry out the tasks
that are essential for their survival and for the consequent survival
of that social system.3
Threats to order come both from the “inside” and the
“outside.”4 “Outside” threats – acts of war – come from other
social systems, e.g., other nation-states.5 Individuals, of course,
conduct war, but in so doing they act on behalf of their sovereign;
they are basically the instruments states use to challenge the
viability of another state.6
“Inside” threats come from within a system, where citizens
prey on other citizens in various ways. Since humans are
individually intelligent, they can choose not to follow the rules that
otherwise ensure internal order, i.e., they can commit crimes or
acts of terrorism.7 Unless societies develop techniques that control
such activity, crime and/or terrorism will threaten the stability of a
social system.8
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The next section reviews how Anglo-American societies
have dealt with the need to control both types of threats and
thereby ensure the order necessary for a society to survive.
I. The Militia, the Posse Comitatus and the Posse Comitatus
Act
The militia and the posse comitatus evolved in AngloSaxon England and were brought to what would become the
United States by the British colonists.9 In Anglo-Saxon times, and
for centuries thereafter, Britain did not have either a standing army
or a professional police force.10 Instead, it relied on two ad hoc
entities, both of which were composed of the able-bodied men of
the community, who were required to be armed and prepared to
use those arms when called upon for assistance.11
When this ad hoc group was called upon to repel a foreign
enemy, it was the militia; when it was called upon to apprehend
criminals, it was the posse comitatus.12 This system prevailed until
into the nineteenth century.13 It faded away as it became apparent
that the militia was no match for professional soldiers, and the
posse comitatus was not capable of dealing with the urban crime
that emerged as the century progressed.14
The eventual result was that by the twentieth century the
United States, along with other countries, had a bifurcated threatcontrol system: the military, an institution staffed by trained
professionals, deals with threats from “outside,” i.e., with attacks
launched by other nation-states.15 And the process of controlling
internal threats – crime and terrorism – became the responsibility
of professional police forces, 16 which trace their origin to Sir
Robert Peel’s establishment of the Metropolitan Police in
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nineteenth-century London.17 Peel replaced the posse comitatus
with a uniformed, quasi-military organization, which proved much
more effective at dealing with the urban crime that increasingly
plagued British cities and their American counterparts.18 Peel’s
system spread to other countries, as well.19 The result is that threat
control is more or less rigidly, depending on the country in
question, divided between the military (warfare) and the police
(crime and terrorism).20
That was not always true, even after the U.S. adopted
professional policing. In the years leading to the Civil War,
federal marshals used troops to enforce federal law, and after the
War federal troops enforced the law in the post-Civil War South.21
As a result of perceived abuses resulting from the latter, in 1878
Congress adopted the Posse Comitatus Act “to put an end to the
use of military for ordinary law enforcement purposes.” 22
The Posse Comitatus Act is still in force and currently states that
“[w]hoever, except in cases . . . expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the
Army or the Air Force . . . to execute the laws shall be fined . . . or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”23 While the Act
explicitly applies only to the Army and Air Force, Department of
Defense regulations extend its restrictions to the Navy and
Marines.24
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The Posse Comitatus Act is the primary principle that bars
the U.S. military from participating in civilian law enforcement.25
As the Supreme Court noted, its unique and exclusive function is
“to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.”26
II. Cyberthreats and the Posse Comitatus Act
This section reviews how cyberthreats undermine the
viability of the threat response system examined in Section I.27 It
also analyzes whether it would be possible, and prudent, to modify
the system in ways that could allow for more flexible responses to
threats of both types.
A. The Problem
As noted above, the United States, like most twenty-first
century nation-states, employs a bifurcated threat-response and
control system which is predicated on the assumption that threats
to social order are readily divisible into “inside” threats (law
enforcement) and “outside” threats (the military). While this
system has proven quite satisfactory in dealing with real-world
threats, it breaks down as threat activity migrates “into”
cyberspace, i.e., as malefactors use digital technology to attack
individual or governmental targets in their own country or halfway
around the world.
Cyberspace transcends spatial boundaries and thereby
erodes the distinction between “inside” and “outside” threats. It
can be difficult to determine whether cyberattacks came from
“inside” or “outside" a particular state. And even if it is clear that
an attack came from “outside,” the attack may not otherwise
conform to the definition of an “outside” attack, i.e., an act of war.
Conversely, when an attack comes from “inside,” it may not
otherwise conform to the definition of an “inside” attack, i.e., it
may not clearly qualify as crime or terrorism.
For example, in the spring of 2013, Mandiant, a U.S.
computer security firm, issued a report that described how a
specialized unit of the People’s Liberation Army28 (“PLA”) was,
and had for years been, hacking into computers of U.S. businesses
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and stealing proprietary information. 29 Stealing proprietary
information is a federal crime.30 The PLA members who were
engaging in this activity were therefore committing a crime “in”
the United States, but this was not a conventional crime.
Uniformed members of a nation-state’s military acting on behalf of
their sovereign were committing it.
That raises a number of difficult issues. For one thing, it is
almost certain that China would not extradite the PLA members to
the United States to be prosecuted for their crimes because China
is, at the very least, complicit in those crimes.31 The civilian law
enforcement system can, as a result, do nothing to retaliate against
or halt this type of activity. For another, the scenario seems to mix
metaphors: since the activity that would otherwise constitute a
crime was carried out by military personnel who were acting on
behalf of their sovereign, does it constitute war?
Or consider a different scenario: in June of 2009,
cybercriminals surreptitiously extracted $415,989 from an account
at the First Federal Savings Bank in Shepherdsville, Kentucky.32
The account belonged to Bullitt County. The transfers were not
discovered until the money was gone. Officials contacted the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, which determined the transfers
originated in Ukraine. The thieves used a Trojan Horse program
installed on the County Treasurer’s computer to extract the funds.33
No one was, and no one will be, charged with the Bullitt
County theft, which is unfortunate because online bank robbery is
far from uncommon: in the spring of 2013, “hackers in Ukraine
and Russia” extracted $1.3 million from a Washington hospital.34
Since the United States does not have an extradition treaty with
Russia, 35 and Ukraine is a cybercrime haven,36 no one will be
prosecuted for this crime, and, like Bullitt County, this hospital
will never recover the lost funds.
29
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What has all this to do with the Posse Comitatus Act? It
has several implications for the system of threat control upon
which the United States relies. One consequence of that system is,
as noted earlier, that law enforcement officers deal with “inside”
threats, which logically implies that they do not pursue “outside”
threats. That, of course, is not literally true, nations have
developed systems in which officers from various countries can
cooperate and offenders can be extradited for prosecution in the
United States.37
The problem is that, while states have historically had an
incentive to cooperate in the apprehension and prosecution of
traditional criminals whose activities can threaten social order in
more than one state, they may not have an incentive to cooperate
when the crimes at issue are virtual and have little, if any,
likelihood of negatively affecting the host country. Cybercrime
can bring billions into a country, like Ukraine or Russia; while the
state itself is usually not complicit in this type of activity, it still
benefits from it.38 And if the haven state’s law enforcement will
not cooperate with U.S. law enforcement that effectively means no
one will be sanctioned for the crime(s).
If these examples seem trivial in their import, consider this:
the bank theft cases illustrate the extent to which U.S. law
enforcement cannot protect American citizens from external crime.
The Mandiant report illustrates the extent to which neither U.S.
law enforcement nor the U.S. military can protect American
citizens from Chinese military personnel who are stealing their
proprietary information. And to make that scenario more
interesting, assume that instead of simply stealing trade secrets, the
PLA members are infiltrating U.S. infrastructures, such as the
power grid and financial system, in order to acquire the ability to
sabotage them, in whole or in part.39
B. Implications for the Posse Comitatus Act?
As we saw above, the United States’ threat response
systems are of little utility in dealing with attacks from abroad.
Law enforcement has little ability to operate in other countries, and
what ability it has depends on the acquiescence and support of the
government in a particular state. This is not surprising, since U.S.
authorities are unlikely to acquiesce in and support the efforts of
foreign law enforcement officers – Russian police, for example –
37
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who wish to conduct an investigation in the United States that
targets U.S. citizens. Law enforcement has been, and continues to
be, parochial.
The military not only has the ability to operate in other
countries, that is its default mission (absent an armed invasion of
U.S. territory). But the military cannot participate in law
enforcement, at least not under the Posse Comitatus Act.40 While
it is not clear if the Act applies extraterritorially, the Department of
Defense operates on the premise that it does, subject to certain
exceptions.41 The Posse Comitatus Act, then, is the only legal
principle that bars cooperation between law enforcement and the
military. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits this: when the
Constitution was drafted the nation’s threat control system
consisted of the able-bodied men of the nation, who acted as law
enforcers or as members of the military, depending on the
circumstances.
Logically, that approach has a certain appeal in a world in
which computer and other technology erodes the import of national
boundaries, especially as far as threat control is concerned. Should
we reassess the Posse Comitatus Act, with an eye to modifying or
repealing it? So far, I continue to be agnostic on that issue, but I
think it is worth exploring to determine if there was a way to think
about how we might approach threat control differently. To that
end, therefore, I shall speculate about what might be involved in
relaxing or eliminating the Act’s prohibition on cooperation
between civilian law enforcement and the military.
C. Repeal or Modify the Posse Comitatus Act
I begin with the most drastic option – eliminating the Act.
Actually, I begin with what I see as two, more or less equally
drastic options: one is to simply repeal the Posse Comitatus Act,
thereby eliminating the prohibition on law enforcement-military
collaboration. The other, somewhat less drastic option, would be
to modify the Posse Comitatus Act so that it bars law enforcementmilitary collaboration in the physical world but not when the
activity at issue involves cyberattacks.
While the notion of repealing the Posse Comitatus Act has
an attractive simplicity, I cannot contemplate such a step without
trepidation. As one author noted, “there is something inherently
40
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repugnant to most Americans at the thought of the military
patrolling the streets of our cities and towns.” 42 This is not
because we do not trust our military, but because we fear what it
might become if we took this step. Also, we would likely gain
little from repealing the Posse Comitatus Act because the military
has no expertise in civilian law enforcement.43 If we went down
this path, we might actually undermine the effectiveness of the
military and law enforcement by eroding the distinctiveness of
their respective missions. And, finally, repealing the Act would be
overkill, since the bifurcated response system seems to work quite
well with regard to activity in the physical world.
That brings us to the other option – modifying the Posse
Comitatus Act so it does not bar law enforcement-military
collaboration with regard to activity that occurs in or is vectored
through cyberspace. Since the impetus for reconsidering it is the
difficulties law enforcement and the military respectively confront
in dealing with cyberthreats, this would seem a more logical, more
focused approach.
The question then becomes, what, precisely, would we seek
to achieve by modifying the Posse Comitatus Act? Do we, for
example, want our military to be able to act as law enforcement
agents (or surrogates) when it is necessary to deal with
cyberattacks from abroad? If the answer to that question is yes,
then I have another question: what, precisely, would we want the
military to do?
In both of the scenarios we examined earlier, foreign
nationals were committing crimes by stealing property (funds in
one case, trade secrets in the other) from American citizens who
were in the United States. In one case, the perpetrators were
members of the Chinese military; in the other, they were Ukrainian
citizens. Unless and until we modify our conceptualization of the
threat array, the activity in both instances constituted crime, rather
than warfare.
It might, therefore, seem as if the U.S. military would have
no conceivable role to play in responding to these and similar
attacks, since I assume no rational person would argue that the
United States should launch a retaliatory military strike on China
(or on Ukraine) in response to these thefts. That does not
necessarily mean that the U.S. military might not be able to assist
law enforcement in ways that could enhance the latter’s ability to
respond effectively to cross-border crimes.
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As we saw above, in neither case will U.S. law
enforcement be able to have the perpetrators extradited so they can
be charged, prosecuted and presumably convicted in the United
States. Some, though, argue that law enforcement should be able
to employ other measures to create at least something of a
disincentive to attack Americans. They contend that U.S. law
enforcement should be able to use “electronic sanctions” to react to
cybercrimes.44 Relatively recently, I discussed this issue with a
former Department of Homeland Security official who, as far as I
could determine, seemed to be arguing that this type of a response
is lawful under Model Penal Code § 3.09(1) either to prevent the
theft of “movable property” or to retake such property.
If we accept that argument, at least for the purposes of
analysis, then we need to address the practicalities it presents: how
is U.S. law enforcement going to use virtual force to strike back at
someone attempting theft who is located in another country? I
have not found any authority for this proposition, but I strongly
suspect U.S. law enforcement does not have the constitution,
statutory or common law authority to attack targets in another
country. The military, of course, does have such authority, at least
as a general matter. So if (and I regard that as a significant
qualifier) we were to decide we want to employ online strike-back
techniques as a way to create disincentives to use cyberspace to
attack American targets, and if we made the appropriate
modifications to the Posse Comitatus Act, the military could either
support law enforcement’s efforts in this regard or actually be
responsible for carrying out the strike-back attacks.
This is but one obvious example of what allowing U.S. law
enforcement and the U.S. military to collaborate in dealing with
extraterritorial cybercrime might involve. I offer this scenario
purely for the purposes of analysis – as a way of illustrating the
possible utility of modifying the Posse Comitatus Act to allow this
type of collaboration. Personally, I have serious reservations about
our going down this path. Aside from anything else, I fear it could
have serious consequences, i.e., that what began as a law
enforcement strike-back attack could escalate until the two
countries were at war with each other, on- and/or off-line.
D. Allow U.S. Law Enforcement to Support Military’s Efforts
in Cyberspace
The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits using the military in
civilian law enforcement.
It does not prohibit using law
44
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enforcement to support the military’s efforts to deal with attacks
from other nation-states. Logically, then, we could allow U.S. law
enforcement officers to support the military’s efforts to deal with
cyberattacks that are directed at U.S. targets and that are carried
out by another nation-state (presumably by its military).
The question then becomes, what might we gain from
taking this step? From the little I know about the U.S. military’s
preparation for cyberwar, I am quite confident they do not need
any assistance in developing the appropriate weaponry or skills
necessary for this endeavor. I am also assuming that law
enforcement officers would add little to the military’s ability to
deal with cyberattacks from other states. This assumption is
basically the converse of the assumption we made above, i.e., that
the military can add little, if anything, to law enforcement’s ability
to deal with crime, including cybercrime.
There is at least one thing that law enforcement might be
able to contribute to the military’s efforts in this regard: threat
information. Unlike conventional warfare, which is conducted in
public and has traditionally been directed at military targets only,
cyberattacks tend to be directed at civilian targets. Earlier, I raised
the scenario in which PLA members are exploring the networks
used by U.S. infrastructure providers to learn how to sabotage
them.45 Civilians, including law enforcement, have much greater
access to information about activity such as this, because while
there may be no statutory or constitutional prohibition on the U.S.
military’s monitoring U.S. civilian entities to detect possible
cyberthreats, this type of activity would probably encounter
opposition from the public, and their representatives.46 While it
would probably not eliminate the opposition, allowing law
enforcement to share information it collected while legitimately
carrying out its professional duties might significantly mitigate it.47
E. Create an Entirely New Entity
Another option I do not support would be to create a new
entity, which was neither wholly law enforcement nor wholly
military but was able to deal with threats that were purely internal,
purely external, and that had elements of each. I do not favor this
because I believe adding another layer of institutional bureaucracy
would only further impede the nation’s ability to deal effectively
with cyberthreats.

45
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F. Regress
Since cyberthreats do not fall neatly into the “inside” –
“outside” threat dichotomy and consequently tend to resist the
efforts of the correlate threat response systems on which we
currently rely, another option would be to begin to decentralize
threat response systems to place at least some responsibility for
identifying and resisting threats on the civilian entities that are
most likely to be targeted. The effort might eventually expand to
do something similar with individual civilians, as well, but it
would be more reasonable, and more feasible, to begin with
corporate and other entities.
Such an effort would, in effect, involve extrapolating the
common law militia and the posse comitatus into the cyber arena
so that companies and other essential institutions would be charged
with protecting themselves from attacks. Government entities,
including law enforcement and the military, could support them in
this regard, with expertise, technologies and other assets. The
advantage of involving the civilian sector is that it would not only
enhance the threat-detection and response capabilities of law
enforcement and the military, it would also give both access to
more detailed threat data than they currently have.
CONCLUSION
The cyberworld is so new that the old structures.
. . break down. . . .48
My arguments and analysis in this piece may seem
simplistic, and that may be a fair assessment because it is very
difficult to addresses the complexities and nuances of the issues I
elected to address in a relatively short piece. My goal here is
simply to point out issues that will become problematic and, as I
noted earlier, speculate a bit about how we might address and
resolve them. I firmly believe that the challenges cyberspace
creates for those we trust to protect us of threats of whatever kind
cannot be underestimated if we are to address and overcome them.
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